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This research commentary introduces historical consciousness to studying 
organizational change. Most theories of organizational change contain within them 
implicit assumptions about history. Made explicit, these assumptions tend to cluster 
into different models of change that vary by the assumed objectivity of the past and 
the associated malleability of the future. We explore and elaborate the implicit 
assumptions of history. We identify four implicit models of history in the change 
literature; History-as-Fact, History-as-Power, History-as-Sensemaking and 
History-as-Rhetoric. We discuss the implications of theorizing organizational 
change from each of these views of history and outline future directions for 
studying change with a heightened understanding of history. 
 
 





Organizational change is a central and enduring subject in management. The 
massive growth in literature on change presents an ongoing challenge for management 
scholars who often must rely on typologies to impose some form of discipline on what is 
increasingly an unruly subject. While typologies offer excellent reviews of the extant 
literature they fail to adequately define what is meant by the concept of change. In much 
of the literature, change lacks “construct clarity” (Suddaby, 2010). The underlying 
assumptions are not articulated, the contextual conditions under which it applies are not 
clear and, often, the concept of change is not defined. Critics suggest that the greatest 
weakness of change management scholarship is that change is a universal but undefined 
construct (Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron, 2001) and its epistemological status is “left 
unexamined” (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001: 404).   
As a result, we often fail to address basic questions about change. How do we know 
when change has successfully occurred? How can we distinguish change from stability? 
Where, in complex organizations, do we look for change? And, perhaps most importantly, 
what do we mean when we say an organization has changed? 
We address these fundamental questions in this essay.  Our central argument is that 
variations in how we conceptualize change are underpinned by different assumptions about 
history and its relationship to our capacity for change. We adopt a historical lens because, 
at their core, the study of change and history both involve the retrospective interpretation 
of past events. There are, however, important differences in how we theorize history.  
The degree to which we see the past as objective or subjective clearly influences 
how we understand change. There is an important but unarticulated relationship between 
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how concrete we believe the past to be and the degree of agency that we introduce into our 
models of change. Those who see the past as an objective reality might reasonably be 
expected to also see the future as highly influenced if not fatalistically determined by 
history. Conversely, those who see the past as highly subjective might equally be expected 
to see the future as much more malleable and open to alternatives based on creative 
interpretations of the past. Our explicit theories of change and our ability to change, thus, 
vary by our implicit models of history. 
In this paper we present four distinct conceptualizations of change, each of which 
rest on a continuum between an objective and a subjective view of history. We term these 
categories History-as-Fact, History-as-Power, History-as-Sensemaking and History-as-
Rhetoric. Each category is representative of distinct assumptions about the nature of the 
past and how our understanding of the past influences how we perceive when change has 
occurred. We argue that each of these categories of implicit assumptions about history 
incorporate related assumptions about our ability to effect change (agency), how we define 




A distinct theme in organizational research contains an implicit assumption that a 
firm’s history makes change extremely difficult. The constraining influence of history is 
understood to occur as the result of three key influences. First, the founding conditions of 
an organization are theorized to exert a powerful influence over the initial structure of the 
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organization and exert a restrictive pressure on subsequent change. This influence is 
perhaps best captured by Stinchcombe’s (1965) construct of imprinting.  
Second, much of the change literature assumes that as time passes, an organization 
ossifies. Like humans, the assumption is that as organizations age, they are seen to acquire 
experiences, traditions and practices, which create powerful forces of internal inertia. The 
construct that best illustrates this concept is Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) notion of 
structural inertia, but is also reflected in related organizational constructs like 
institutionalization (Selznick, 1949) or cognitive sunk costs (Oliver, 1997). 
Third, many models of change assume that decisions in the past restrict human 
agency and strategic choice. Past decisions influence present decisions and, with the 
accumulation of time, opportunities for change inexorably narrow into a deterministic form 
of path dependence. This assumption is best illustrated by the construct termed escalation 
of commitment (Staw, 1976) but is also evident in related constructs like path dependence 
(Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011) or historical lock-in (Arthur, 1989; 1994). 
These models of change share some common, and perhaps erroneous, assumptions 
about history. First, time is understood to be a continuous, measurable and linear flow that 
occurs, for the most part, independently of human experience. Second, the cumulative 
passage of time – i.e. the past – creates a sedimentary accumulation of past events and 
experiences that collectively become expressed as “traditionalizing” (Stinchcombe, 1965) 
or “inertial” (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) forces that limit an organization. Finally, the 
process of reflecting on the past, and interpreting it – i.e. history – is seen to be an act of 
objective reconstruction that is largely absent of human agency. The analysis of 
organizational history, which is understood to be the faithful accumulation of ‘brute facts’ 
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(Searle, 1995), serves to constrain human agency rather than to generate opportunities and 
alternatives for change.  
The notion that organizational history is objective and oppressive to change is, 
perhaps, the dominant view in management research. These assumptions suggest that 
because time and history reduce agency, change is very difficult to accomplish because any 
change effort must face the herculean task of overcoming the past. Change, in this view, 
typically requires an exogenous shock or some form of profound intervention that 
forcefully disrupts the constraining influence of history. 
Key Constructs: Imprinting, Structural Inertia, Escalation of Commitment 
Imprinting: Stinchcombe (1965) observed that the founding conditions of an 
organization play a long-lasting role in its future development. Drawing from 
developmental psychology, Stinchcombe observed that, at founding, organizations are 
particularly sensitive to adopting influences and characteristics from their external 
environment. Once adopted, these characteristics tend to persist. In support of this 
assertion, Stinchcombe points to the high degree of similarity in the structure of 
organizations founded during a similar historical period.  
The construct of imprinting has been very influential in theories of organizational 
change (Marquis & Tilsic, 2013). Most work has focused on demonstrating that founding 
characteristics persist throughout the life of an organization (Boeker, 1989). Research thus, 
has demonstrated the role of imprinting in the persistence of organizational structure 
(Barron, Hannan & Burton, 1999), network structures (Marquis, 2003) and a host of related 
organizational outcomes (Kimberly, 1979; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). More current 
research has turned attention to understanding why some environmental characteristics are 
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adopted and others are not and the processes by which those characteristics are made to 
persist (Johnson, 2007). 
A clear implication of imprinting research is that the historical conditions at 
founding severely limit an organization’s ability to change. History constitutes an objective 
reality that episodically fixes organizational conditions and constrains the agency of 
managers who seek to change the organization. Change, in imprinting research, is largely 
the result of an exogenous shock that threatens the viability of the organization (Lippman 
& Aldrich, 2013). 
Structural Inertia: A similar understanding of the restrictive influence of history 
and time is offered by Hannan & Freeman’s (1977) concept of structural inertia. 
Organizations, they observe, suffer from “strong inertial pressures on structure arising from 
both internal arrangements (for example, internal politics) and from the environment (for 
example, public legitimation of organizational activity)” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977: 957). 
Internal factors that contribute to inertia in organizations include sunk costs (actual and 
cognitive), political coalitions and the growth of bureaucracy. External inertial forces are 
commonly known in strategic management and include access to resources, barriers to 
entry and competitive pressures. Collectively, these factors make organizational change 
extremely difficult to accomplish. 
Similar to imprinting, the construct of structural inertia adopts a highly 
deterministic view of time and history. The concept is based on the assumption that 
organizational success is dependant upon an organization’s ability to consistently 
reproduce routines and structures that initially made the organization successful. As a result 
young organizations are assumed to be extremely vulnerable to competition and are likely 
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to fail. Old organizations, which have successfully stabilized the reproduction of routines 
and structures, risk becoming ossified and unable to adapt to environmental change. 
The cumulative weight of an organization’s history is often cited as a reason why 
firms are unable to strategically adapt to internal and external challenges. Oliver (1997) 
argues that history and tradition are linked to specific ways that firms process information 
and conduct their operations. These “cognitive sunk costs” restrict managers from thinking 
about strategic challenges differently which hampers and often prevents change. History is 
an objective and immutable fact that managers have to cope with. 
Escalation of Commitment: The term ‘escalation of commitment’ refers to a well-
established phenomenon in which actors (e.g., individuals, groups, organizations) continue 
with a course of action despite accumulating negative outcomes. Staw (1976) used a 
simulated investment decision to demonstrate that individuals who felt responsible for a 
losing course of action were more likely to increase their investment than individuals who 
did not.  
The term is broadly applied to contexts where a history of decision-making 
produces large “sunk costs” that irrationally constrain human agency so that managers 
continue to commit resources to a clearly failed strategy. The resilience of the phenomenon 
has been aptly demonstrated by studies in such diverse fields as game theory (Zardkoohi, 
2004), psychology (Moon, 2001) and political science (Fearon, 1994). 
A core assumption of the escalation of commitment concept is that past events and 
behaviours create serious constraints for future action. Staw (1981) explains this with the 
observation that broad social norms of appropriate behaviour dictate that leaders and 
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managers should be consistent over time. As a result, managers tend to stick with decisions 
once made because that is what leaders are assumed to do. 
Implications for Change 
 
Collectively, these three constructs – imprinting, structural inertia and escalation of 
commitment – demonstrate how our implicit assumptions of history inform our explicit 
models of change. An objective, positivist view of history contains within it a series of 
related but unarticulated assumptions that define the difficulty of change, the key to 
successful change, the focal unit of change and how we know when change has occurred. 
We examine each of these implications in turn. 
Difficulty of Change: Change theorists who hold a positivist and objective view of 
history tend to see change as a difficult process that can only be successful through extreme 
levels of episodic intervention. In this perspective, because history is understood as an 
inexorable accumulation of events that constrain choice, over time organizations are 
assumed to acquire inertial properties (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Events that occur early 
in the life history of the organization persist and are felt powerfully as the organization 
ages. Organizations, in this view, age like humans and grow increasingly rigid over time. 
Resisting change is seen as the default state of most organizations and change, typically, 
only occurs when organizations are faced with few alternatives.  
Similarly, an objective view of history as unfettered facts tends to limit assumptions 
of human agency. That is, an implicit assumption of history as “brute fact” carries with it 
an associated assumption of deterministic fatalism. Researchers in this tradition, thus, 
structure models of change in which early events both determine later events and delimit 
alternatives – a process described as “path dependence” (e.g. Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; 
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Sydow, Scheyögg & Koch, 2009). Human agency to effect change is limited, not only 
because of the powerful determination of the past but also because of the implicit inability 
of human participants to alter their interpretation of the past.  
Success of Change: The impetus for change is typically “exogenous” and takes the 
form of an “environmental jolt” (Meyer, 1982; Sine & David, 2003) or a forced 
intervention that arises independent of the organization. Models of successful endogenous 
change must overcome the powerful calcifying effects assumed to accumulate over time. 
Internally induced change, thus, must simulate the profound disruptive effect of an 
exogenous shock. The enormous effort required to accomplish this simulated jolt is perhaps 
best illustrated by Lewin’s classic description of facilitating change by first “unfreezing” 
the organization – i.e. dislodging the inertial “rust” that has accumulated over time, 
executing the change and then “refreezing” the organization (Lewin, 1947). 
Unit of Change: The focal unit of change in this perspective is the entity – i.e. the 
organization or, more specifically, the organizational structure. Researchers know that 
change has occurred when the entity passes from one state to another. This linear and 
objectivist view of change, as Quattrone and Hopper (2001: 408) observe, is predicated on 
epistemological assumptions that time is linear and history is objective. Organizations 
‘change’ when they adopt new structures or operations. Change is defined in terms of 
naiive positivism – a material change in states of being that occur in a segmented and linear 
temporal domain. 
It is important to recognize, however, that not all change theorists accept these 
underlying assumptions of time and history or this particular definition of change. This 
view tends to overemphasize the importance of structural or design changes in 
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organizations and tends to underemphasize the role of changes in culture or meaning 
systems (Meyerson & Martin, 1987). Clearly, thus, there are alternative assumptions about 
the nature of history and its effect on models of change. As we demonstrate in the next 
section, there are other models of change that are based on implicit assumptions about 
history in which the past is much less concrete and the ability to interpret it offers 





A somewhat different view of organizational change emerges if the assumption of 
history as objective fact is retained, but the focal point of change is not the design or 
structure of the organization, but rather is the power structure of the various coalitions or 
entities within the organization. This perspective of organizational change draws directly 
from Marx’s view of history and is based on three key assumptions. 
First, this perspective of organizational change carries an implicit assumption of 
historical materialism. All social structures, including societies, communities and 
organizations, are “historically constituted” into relations of production that define both 
social position or class and the division of labour (Clegg, 1981: 542).  Change typically 
serves to consolidate the power of owners or managers. For the working class, historical 
change is manifest in the increasing specialization of work – i.e. breaking it into discrete 
units of repetitive activity – which enables increased intensification of the frequency of 
production.  
A second assumption is that the inexorable effect of history is to solidify, not the 
design and operational structure of organizations as is suggested by the History-as-Fact 
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view, but rather differences in power of various coalitions within the organization. The 
increased disaggregation of work, often termed “Fordism” or “Taylorism” (Kanigel, 2005), 
tends to crystallize differences in power in organizations by granting increasing control to 
owners and their surrogates while disempowering and alienating workers.  
A third assumption is that change occurs dialectically. As historically constituted 
power structures, organizations exist in relatively long periods of stasis during which the 
pressures for entropy and change exist in relative equilibrium effectively counterbalancing 
the various power coalitions within the firm. Small incremental efforts to change are 
relatively ineffective because the power differences in the social structure of organizations 
encourage workers to resist change. Mid-level managers also encourage stasis as they seek 
to maintain carefully constructed “webs of interdependent relationships with buyers, 
suppliers, and financial backers" (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985: 177) to preserve existing 
patterns of culture, norms and ideology.  
Collectively, historical materialism, power and dialectical change present a view of 
history that constrains change because of intricately counter balanced pressures for change 
and stability. History is still understood to be objective, and time is linear, unidirectional 
and largely independent of human experience. The cumulative passage of time – i.e. history 
– is seen to promote stasis and inertia.   
However the History-as-Power perspective acknowledges greater capacity for 
human agency to effect change because it acknowledges the ability of individuals to reflect 
upon the history of power relations and to act upon them. As we describe below, this view 
of history tends to produce models of change characterized by long periods of stability, but 
punctuated by distinct bursts of revolutionary change. 
 11 
Key Constructs: Contradiction, Praxis and Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
Contradiction: A central concept in the History-as-Power view is the Hegelian 
understanding that all social systems are complex collections of coalitions of different 
interests (Benson, 1977; Clegg, 1981). Over the history of an organization, ongoing 
interaction tends to exacerbate existing contradictions and produce new ones (Ford & Ford, 
1994). Typically these oppositional contradictions counterbalance each other and result in 
long periods of stasis or resistance to change. Periodically however, the contradictions 
between opposing forces become unbalanced and change occurs (Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995).  
The construct of contradiction is pervasive in the change literature and has been 
used to theorize processes of change at the individual (Jermier, 1985), organizational (Ford 
& Ford, 1995) and institutional (Seo & Creed, 2002) levels of analysis. Organizational 
contradictions often initiate moments of organizational change that compromise the 
performance of an organization. So, for example, firms sometimes initiate change in an 
effort to appear legitimate to internal or external audiences, knowing fully that the change 
will reduce profit or efficiency (Westphal & Zajac, 1993; Lamertz & Baum, 1998). 
Some firms, because of historically accumulated dominant internal coalitions, 
become resistant to change and engage in acts of conformity or competency traps (Levitt 
& March, 1988) that undermine future success. Miller (1990) describes these firms as 
suffering from the “Icarus Paradox” noting that the source of a firm’s internal success often 
creates an irrational internal commitment to actively resisting change even when doing so 
threatens the firm’s existence.  
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Praxis: Over long periods of stability, much of organizational life, including roles, 
status orders and acts of resistance to change tend to become reified or attributed to an 
autonomous authority that exists outside the organization. Only through ongoing reflection 
about the history of an organization can organizational participants come to realize that 
they themselves are the creators of this organizational power structure that appears to 
constrain their own agency (Morgan, 1997). The key to successful organizational change, 
then, is the ability to overcome the power of the past by unlearning it (Kolb, 1996), by 
reinterpreting it (Bartunek, 1993) or by critically analyzing one’s organizational history 
(Barrett & Srivistava, 1991). 
The process of reflecting on and overcoming one’s collective history is called 
organizational praxis (Bradbury & Mainemilis, 2001). Perhaps the best empirical 
application of the use of praxis (Heydebrand, 1983) is offered by Bartunek’s (1984) case 
study in a Roman Catholic religious order. The changes, which came to be known as 
“Vatican II”, encouraged the Church to reintegrate with world society. This represented a 
fundamental challenge to the order, which had, for centuries, adopted the philosophy of the 
need to remain separate from the secular world. The proposed change, thus, represented a 
cosmological change for the order, requiring what amounted to a denial of much of the 
organization’s prior history. 
Bartunek (1984) observed a successful and incremental process of change. She 
explains this somewhat surprising outcome as the result of successful dialectical change in 
which the original world view (or “thesis”) was challenged by a contradictory world view 
(or anti-thesis) and was, gradually, resolved by collectively and critically reflecting upon 
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and integrating the old and the new world views into a creative new world view (i.e. 
synthesis).  
Punctuated Equilibrium: While the concept of praxis describes how opportunities 
for change are first identified in the History-as-Power approach, the process through which 
change occurs is captured by the construct of punctuated equilibrium. Borrowed from 
evolutionary biology, punctuated equilibrium refers to processes of change characterized 
by long periods of relative stability interrupted by short, sharp episodes of revolutionary 
change. This model of change is quite influential and has been used to explain change at 
multiple levels of analysis including individuals (Levinson, 1978), the small group 
(Gersick, 1988), organizations (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) and social or organizational 
fields (Meyer, Gaba & Colwell, 2005).  
Tushman and Romanelli’s (1994) study of change in the microcomputer industry 
offers an early field level empirical demonstration of punctuated equilibrium. They 
observed that changes in the firms were clustered, as would be predicted by a punctuated 
equilibrium model of change, rather than randomly dispersed, as might be expected under 
a gradual, more evolutionary model of change. Significantly, they also demonstrate that 
models of punctuated equilibrium are described by distinct shifts in the power distribution 
within organizations over time. Long periods of power consolidation are associated with 
organizational stability, but shifts in the power distribution in the organization are typically 
associated with spasms of revolutionary change. 
Punctuated equilibrium also operates at group level processes of change. Gersick 
(1988) observed that project teams evolve through two main phases separated by a 
transition phase. During the initial inertial phase group, members apply traditional thinking 
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strategies and work routines to their project and devote time to developing roles and 
political coalitions designed to resolve conflicts. In the transition phase, which occurs at 
roughly the midpoint of the allotted time, the inertia is disrupted and members initiate 
major changes in their work strategy. During the second phase, group members return to a 
phase of relative stability. Gersick (1988: 28) describes the process of change as a 
“dialectical” model of punctuated equilibrium. 
A clear implication of this approach to change is that history tends to crystallize 
power structures in an organization. As a result, change is dialectical and characterized by 
long phases of relative inertia maintained by countervailing political pressures within the 
organization. At certain points of time, however, the equilibrium is disrupted and change 
occurs, typically in a revolutionary burst of activity.  
Implications for Change 
In combination the constructs of contradiction, praxis and punctuated equilibrium 
describe a distinct and well-established model of change that is predicated upon an implicit 
model of history in which history is still objective and deterministic, but holds the key to 
emancipatory change. Adopting an assumption that history is power offers a different 
definition of the construct of change – with distinct implications about how difficult change 
is, how to successfully implement change in organizations and how we know when change 
has actually occurred. We summarize these observations in the balance of this section. 
Difficulty of Change: Conceptualizing change through the lens of History-as-Power 
allows a somewhat more dominant role for human agency in processes of change. Agency 
is enacted through reflexivity and praxis – i.e. through the ability of individuals or 
collectives to overcome the constraints of their history through retrospection, critical 
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reflection and creative visioning (Foster & Weibe, 2010; Jermier, 1985; Suddaby, Viale & 
Gendron, 2016). Change, as a result, is not only possible to achieve it is somewhat 
inevitable.  
Success of Change: In this view, the possibility of change can be identified through 
organizational praxis, or deep reflection on the historical conditions that created present 
organizational arrangements and the associated insight that the existing power structure 
can be changed. Change occurs in periods of punctuated equilibrium or revolutionary 
change, during which the existing power structures are dissolved and replaced by new ones. 
Grenier (1972: 166) describes such dialectical change as a series of small adaptations that 
accumulate over time to produce a profoundly new organization. “As a company 
progresses through developmental phases” he notes “each evolutionary period creates its 
own revolution.” 
Unit of Change: In dialectical models of change the primary unit of analysis is the 
balance of power between opposing forces in an organization (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
Such forces can become manifest in various forms but most research has focused on 
political coalitions and their struggle for dominance in organizations. A range of terms are 
used to describe these political groups including “dominant coalitions” (Cyert & March, 
1963), “upper echelons” (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004) “incumbents and 
challengers” (Fligstein, 2001) and “top management teams” (Wiersma & Bantel, 1992).  
From this dialectical perspective organizations are understood to be historical 
accretions of power. While history is still understood to be objective, the key mechanisms 
of change – contradiction, praxis, punctuated equilibrium – are largely ideo-historical. That 
is, they are each based on different ways of cognitively integrating the past, present and 
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future. As we argue in the next section, when we relax our assumptions about the 
objectivity of history, the restrictions on human agency are similarly relaxed and the 




A third view adopts a phenomenological view of history. Phenomenology is based 
on the premise that reality consists of experiences, objects and events as experienced in 
human consciousness, rather than in the objects, events and experiences themselves. In 
management theory, phenomenology is best reflected in Weick’s (1995) notion of 
sensemaking in which organizational reality is based on how participants interpret their 
collective experience. Sensemaking thus privileges human interpretation of events over the 
‘brute facts’ of reality and “is less about discovery than invention” (Weick, 1995: 13). 
Three key assumptions define the construct. First, sensemaking rejects the 
essentialist assumption that change occurs as a discrete event outside human 
consciousness. Instead, change occurs in human cognition when some events are selected 
out of the ongoing flow of organizational experience and are identified and labeled as 
“change” (Weick, 1979). Second, these interpretive processes can occur collectively, at the 
level of groups (Gephart, 1984), organizations (Daft & Weick, 1984) or even larger social 
groups (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Shared assumptions of social reality hold a 
determinative effect of group values. Third, shared schema about how to interpret past 
events has a powerful influence on future behaviour. That is, the cognitive frames that we 
use to experience the reality of the present are based on retrospective and collective 
interpretations of past events. In turn, past events delimit the array of choices available for 
future action. 
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These assumptions – which in the sensemaking literature are termed enactment, 
collective frames of reference and the role of past interpretation on future behaviour – 
present a view of history as a phenomenological subject of human interpretation rather than 
an objective set of immutable facts. Not only is history a matter of interpretive construction, 
time is viewed not as a linear and unidirectional flow, but as a process of understanding 
achieved in an iterative pluperfect form – i.e. moving back and forth between the past and 
present.  
Key Constructs: Retrospective Enactment, Selection and Identity 
Three key constructs help to illustrate how the implicit assumptions of history, 
described above, influence explicit models of change in sensemaking theory: retrospective 
enactment, selection and identity. We elaborate each below. 
Retrospective Enactment: Enactment refers to the process in symbolic interaction 
theory through which shared meaning systems are brought into reality through action. So, 
for example, a young doctor encountering a patient for the first time enacts the script of 
professionalism by acting as if she always has been a physician. By reaching back to pre-
existing cultural templates – scripts, roles, traditions – the physician can effectively use the 
past to make sense of the future. Retrospective enactment, thus, uses creative historical 
reasoning to produce outcomes based on retrospective assessments of events that have not 
yet occurred. A key element of sensemaking is the ability to engage in ‘future-perfect-
thinking’ by using past tense to impose order on a chaotic and unknowable future (Weick, 
1979). 
Schultz and Hernes’ (2013) account of the resurgence of the Danish toy 
manufacturer LEGO aptly illustrates the use of retrospective enactment. The authors 
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describe two distinct historical strategies used by the company in its change efforts. The 
first strategy encouraged team members to analyze “lessons of the past” and focused on 
short-term time horizons. That is, they studied failed attempts at organizational identity-
change from a few decades in the past and encouraged team members to use those findings 
to develop identity claims in the near-future, i.e. nine months ahead.  
The second strategy involved much longer time horizons in which team members 
reached back 75 years to the early founding of the firm, to identify the essence of the firm, 
a time period that extended well beyond the invention of the core product of the firm (the 
building block). The team, ultimately, identified the promotion of child development and 
creativity as its enduring essence and helped stimulate a renaissance of new products for 
the firm. 
LEGO, thus, used sensemaking techniques to motivate strategic change by 
retrospectively reconstructing a degree of coherence and continuity between the 
organization’s past history and a, largely predefined, future direction. Historicizing the 
present and the future through retrospective sensemaking, according to Weick (1995: 29) 
provides “the feeling of order, clarity and rationality”.  
Selection: Selection refers to the process by which actors select plausible 
interpretations of data based on how well these interpretations are thought to fit with past 
understandings. Acts of selection depend on assumptions of bracketing in which actors 
make sense of the raw flow of experience by creating temporal continuity between some 
events and temporal discontinuity between others. The process of selecting some events as 
continuous or discontinuous with others is a way of imposing meaning on experience by 
making it consistent or inconsistent with cognitive templates drawn from the past. 
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Ravasi and Phillips (2011) for example demonstrate how the venerable Danish 
design firm, Bang & Olufsen, employed processes of selective bracketing to realign their 
strategy to better fit with changes in the external, competitive environment. The company 
periodically revised the history of the organization to mask profound changes in the 
strategic direction of the company as being consistent with the past.  Executives used 
legitimation techniques to ensure that organizational participants did not select or bracket 
change efforts as unique events. 
 A similar example of using selection to create disjuncture with the past is offered 
by Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) analysis of arguments used by accountants to 
challenge the legitimacy of a new organizational form – multidisciplinary partnerships – 
that threatened to allow large accounting firms to assume ownership of law firms. 
Opponents of the new form used a variety of verbal techniques to emphasize how 
threatening the new form was by characterizing the profession as “being at a crossroad”, 
“crossing the Rubicon” and “failing to honor their past”. Persuasive language can be used 
to skilfully characterize an event as discontinuous with the past and therefore dangerous. 
Rhetoric, thus, is used to bracket and select an event as illegitimate. 
Identity: Change succeeds when it is seen to be consistent with past behaviour. 
Gioia and colleagues observe that a reconstituted history assists change in organizations by 
creating a coherent identity. Identity, they argue, can only be articulated through 
retrospective interpretation. As conditions change, however, so too do our interpretations 
of the past. As a result, “all history is likely to become revisionist history” (Gioia, Corley 
& Fabbri, 2002: 623). 
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For example, Howard-Grenville, Metzger and Meyer (2013) demonstrate how 
revisionist history is employed to create identity. In their analysis of the resurrection of the 
community identity of Eugene, Oregon they show how actors used “orchestrated 
experiences” based on recreating elements of the city’s historical “golden age” as “Track 
Town” to reconnect stakeholders with the city’s storied past. These activities involved 
strategically drawing from “Eugene’s history, saluting athletes, rhapsodizing about heroic 
performances and celebrating Hayward Field itself” (Howard Grenville et al, 2013: 128). 
History, thus, offers a critical but somewhat invisible or intangible resource that was 
effectively mobilized by select rhetorical strategies designed to resurrect a communal 
identity sedimented by years of neglect. 
Sensemaking, thus, is a process by which organizational participants cognitively 
reconstruct events as either change or continuity through processes of collective 
interpretation and re-interpretation of identity. History, in this view, is not objective and 
the process of reconstructing the past is not bound by the brute facts of the past. Rather, the 
act of interpreting the past is motivated by an interest in constructing an identity of the 
organization as either continuous or discontinuous with an imagined future. 
 
Implications for Change 
 
Collectively the concepts of retrospective enactment, selection and identity 
introduce a model of change that is defined, not by a linear transition through phases of 
unfreezing, changing state and refreezing, as defined by Lewin (1947), but rather is 
characterized by human cognition and interpretation. This model of change builds on a 
well-established stream of phenomenological research (Daft & Weick, 1984; Quinn & 
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Kimberly, 1984; Gephart, 1984) in which the pace, direction and success of change is 
managed by the interpretations of events by dominant collectives in the organization.  
Sensemaking theory dominates this approach to change but is supported by related 
theoretical traditions including events-based construction (Isabella, 1990), cultural change 
(Pettigrew, 1987; Schein, 1985) and symbolic interactionist approaches to change (Barley, 
1986; Pondy, Frost, Morgan & Dandridge, 1983). A clear differentiator of this model of 
change is its overt acknowledgement of the importance of the past and the critical role of 
selective memory in reconstructing salient elements of the past to create a credible history. 
Difficulty of Change: This approach ascribes a high degree of human agency to 
managing processes of change which is in contrast to the more essentialist approaches 
embedded in both the History-as-Fact and History-as-Power approaches. The key 
challenge in managing change is not in controlling what events happen, as Lewin (1947) 
suggests, but, rather, in creating shared interpretations of what happened. That is, change 
requires an interpretive shift in the cognitive frames that define the dominant reality of the 
organization.  
Success of Change: Viewing change through the lens of History-as-Sensemaking 
substantially changes organizational assessments of successful change. In this model, 
change often occurs iteratively and retrospectively. Because interpretation occurs after 
events have occurred, successful change is only apparent a posteriori and once a collective 
assessment of the change effort has emerged. 
Unit of Change: In contrast to the prior models of change, where the primary unit 
of analysis was the organizational entity (either its organizational structure or its power 
structure), in the History-as-Sensemaking approach the clear unit of analysis is the marked 
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shift in meaning or cognition that occurs within a social group. Weick uses the term 
“cosmological episode” to capture the disruptions in meaning systems that occur when 
organizations adopt a new interpretive scheme. Cosmology episodes are characterized by 
a sudden and profound loss of rationality or meaning in one’s lived experience where prior 
perceptions of change, which once made sense, no longer cohere and participants are forced 






A fourth implicit model of history extends the view that conceptualization of the 
past is interpretive with the added assumption that the process of interpreting the past is 
highly agentic and can be deliberately manipulated for strategic purposes. The term 
rhetorical history is used to describe the “strategic use of the past as a persuasive strategy 
to manage key stakeholders of the firm” (Suddaby, Foster & Quinn-Trank, 2010: 157). 
Participants in processes of organizational change are assumed to have high degrees of 
agency in creating narratives of the past designed to facilitate strategic change in 
organizations. 
In this view history is essentially a narrative of the past and is therefore highly 
subjective. This critical view of historiography rejects the notion of a single unifying 
historical account or ‘grand narrative’ and suggests that the depth and richness of available 
‘brute facts’ of the past offers skilled rhetoricians a potentially infinite number of equally 
valid histories. 
As a result history is assumed to be more biased by the present and future than 
previous views of history have allowed and the construction of any particular history is 
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deliberate and strategic. Hobsbawm (1983: 1), thus demonstrated how many “ancient” 
traditions are, in reality, of fairly recent origin. He coined the term, invented tradition to 
identify a range of contemporary social institutions that deliberately claim certain rituals, 
routines and practices to be much older than they actually are in order to make claims of 
authenticity, continuity and legitimacy.  
Key Constructs: Periodization/Continuation, Memorialization and Strategic 
Forgetting 
 
The notion that history is highly malleable and open to revision helps define a 
model of change that uses narratives of history to facilitate strategic change. We elaborate 
three constructs upon which the concept of rhetorical history is based – 
periodization/continuation, memorialization and strategic forgetting. 
Periodization/Continuation: One of the simplest ways for organizations to 
rhetorically reconstruct history is to impose artificial categories on the continuous flow of 
time and experience.  Periodization is the process of retrospectively cultivating “the idea 
of a radical transformation in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’ (Ybema, 2014: 499). 
Periodization is largely accomplished through rhetoric that serves to bracket temporal 
experience. Periodization bears some similarity to Weick’s (1979) notion of “bracketing” 
but differs in the degree of deliberation and agency. That is, in contrast to bracketing which 
is largely a pre-conscious form of cognition, periodization is intentional and strategic. 
Perhaps the best empirical illustration of the use of periodization as a rhetorical 
strategy for change is offered by Biggart’s (1977) analysis of the change effort in the US 
Postal service. Biggart attributes the success of the effort, in part, to the ability of the change 
agents to artificially create a sense of division between the past and the future. They 
achieved this by demonizing and discrediting long held values and the removal of many of 
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the symbols of the “old” organization – i.e. retiring the 200 year old name of the 
organization, designing a new logo with modern typeface, repainting thousands of postal 
trucks and mailboxes – in what was described as a corporate “make-over”. Biggart (1977) 
emphasizes the critical role played by internal and external corporate communication in 
articulating the core message that the old organization “was no more” in a deliberate effort 
to rhetorically destroy the old history of the organization. 
Disengaging with the past through a formal declaration of a division in time is 
essential to creating a new organizational reality (Jick, 1993) and has the effect of 
retroactively changing both the past and the future. Imposing periods on the continuous 
flow of time is a form of “mnemonic cutting and pasting” (Zerubavel, 2012) that uses 
language to impose meaning and significance onto discrete chunks of time (Czarniawski, 
1997). Periodization, thus, is an effective way of facilitating change by rhetorically 
reconfiguring the past and reimagining the future through the lens of the present. 
Memorializing:  A related rhetorical strategy of changing the past is the act of 
memorializing periods of the past in an effort to signal either continuity or a breach with 
the past. Considerable research has documented the empirical fact of corporate 
memorialization, which tends to use celebrations to reify a disjuncture or signal closure 
with the past (Deal and Key, 1998) or rituals, which are used to signal continuity with the 
past (Dacin, Munir & Tracey, 2010). So, for example, research has emphasized the 
importance of the mourning the passage of a celebrated CEO, such as Steve Jobs, in order 
to mark transition to a new form of leadership (Bell & Taylor, 2016) or canonizing the 
iconic image of a founder (Foster, Suddaby, Minkus, Wiebe, 2010). Often memorializing 
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involves a high degree of revisionist history and a deep reliance on nostalgia – or appeals 
to an invented past that never actually was (Gabriel, 1993; Strangleman, 1999). 
Memorializing the transition to a new period in corporate history aids change by 
giving organizational members an opportunity to honour the past (Wilkins & Bristow, 
1987) and achieve symbolic closure that makes real the passage from one moment of reality 
to another (Jick, 1993). Such closure is essential to successful change and requires some 
form of institutional recognition or acknowledgement by the organization. The central 
objective of memorialization is to reify the periodization of past events.  It is also to 
reinforce and emphasize those values from the past that are still valued while providing 
organizational members with a path to a new and altered organization. 
Strategic Forgetting: A growing body of research demonstrates that organizations 
often engage in acts of intentionally erasing elements of their collective memory in order 
to facilitate change. Strategic forgetting “…can be a critical first step in organizational 
renewal when an organization needs to change” (Holan & Phillips, 2004: 425). In a study 
of Canadian hotels adapting to local conditions in Cuba, (Holan and Phillips (2014) 
document how successful hotels strategically discarded well established routines and 
schemas that had been successful in the past, in order to make room for new knowledge, 
innovative routines and fresh schemas. Forgetting “is an important managerial concern and 
must be managed or the organization will pay the price for failing to do so” (Holan & 
Phillips, 2014: 1612). 
A related study of change in a French aeronautics company documented repeated 
and strategic omissions of historical fact in the firm’s corporate bulletin (Anteby & Molnar, 
2012). The researchers identify two basic types of strategic forgetting; structural 
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omissions, in which historical facts that contradict managerial identity claims for the 
company are intentionally omitted, and preemptive neutralizations, where management 
deliberately reframes contradictory historical facts with a view to mute problematic identity 
cues in an organization’s past. 
Implications for Change 
When history is understood to be a rhetorical resource that can be reconstructed to 
suit strategic purposes, the models of change are characterized by high degrees of agency 
in managing the past for future interests. This approach draws on a long history of research 
on the important role of narrative in processes of organizational change (Boje, 1991; 
Humphreys & Brown, 2002; Brown & Humphreys, 2003) but focuses specifically on 
narratives that strategically re-interpret the past for present or future purposes.  
Difficulty of Change: In contrast to prior implicit models of objective history, where 
the past is viewed as an essentialist constraint on action, this model of history grants 
tremendous creative license to change agents interested in revising a firm’s narrative of its 
past. There are clear constraints to the degree to which the past can be revised, as the 
German corporations Bertelsmann and Volkswagen discovered in their attempts to revise 
their historical narratives in order to deny affiliations with the Nazi regime (Booth, Clark, 
Delahaye, Procter & Rowlinson, 2007). However, the change literature, particularly 
techniques that use scenario planning reinforce the powerful role played by selective 
reconstruction of the past as a means of facilitating change in the present. Scenario 
planning, like rhetorical history, is premised on the assumption that corporations, like 
human beings, are capable of revising their past in order to achieve a desired future. The 
key to successful scenario planning is to creatively avoid the assumed objectivity of the 
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past by questioning taken-for-grantedness assumptions about prior interpretations of the 
past (Schwartz, 1991). 
Unit of Change: The primary unit of analysis in change processes that are based on 
implicit models of History-as-Rhetoric is the historical narrative itself (McGaughey, 2013). 
Research in organizational storytelling has demonstrated that effective stories are far more 
persuasive or effective in changing attitudes than the use of statistics or other quantitative 
data (Martin & Powers, 1983). The test of whether change has occurred, thus, is when the 
organizational narrative and associated practices (traditions, rituals, descriptions of heroes 
and villains and claims of uniqueness based on history) have been changed. 
Success of Change: In order to be successful, narratives must adopt all of the 
elements of successful rhetoric (Burke, 1969; Booth, 1983). The narrative must be coherent 
and credible. The strategic intent of the story must be disguised (Barry & Elmes, 1997) and 
it is advantageous, but not necessary, that the narrative is based on a kernel of objective 
fact. As Gardner (1995: 56) observes, a visionary leader must offer a story “that builds on 
the most credible of past syntheses, revisits them in the light of present concerns, leaves 
open a space for future events, and allows individual contributions by the persons in the 
group”. Credibility in rhetorical history, thus, is based on the same criterion as most 
storytelling, but necessitates storytelling structures that capture convincing and believable 
accounts of the past. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our central objective has been to demonstrate how implicit models of history have 
influenced explicit models of organizational change in management studies. Drawing a 
continuum in which history is seen to be largely objective and deterministic, on one hand, 
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and largely subjective and malleable on the other, we describe four implicit models of 
history that define different explicit models of organizational change. We elaborate the 
implications that each of these implicit models of history hold for what change is, how it 
unfolds and where, in an organization, we should look in order to successfully manage 
change. We summarize these implications in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
One of the critical insights of our analysis is the demonstrative lack of construct 
clarity in the concept of change. Depending upon their implicit models of history, theorists 
often mean different things when they use the word ‘change’. What must change and what 
must stay the same when organizations change? Our analysis indicates that our answer to 
this question depends, largely, on which implicit model of history we subscribe to and how 
we understand the reciprocal relationship between change and stability.  
Can we say that change has occurred if the structure of the entity remains the same 
but the political value structure changes? Advocates of History-as-Fact would say “no” but 
those who see History-as-Power might disagree. Similarly, can we say that change has 
occurred when a radical new technology, such as the electric light bulb or the automobile 
has been introduced? Perhaps, at least according to the standard of change set by the 
History-as-Fact view. But the empirical evidence suggests that, in order for the innovation 
to be successful, considerable rhetoric will be required to suggest that the innovation is 
either continuous with the past (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) or a significant breach of the 
past (Rao, 1994) – a definition of change offered by the History-as-Rhetoric view. 
 29 
What is less well understood is how these implicit models of history influence the 
capacity to manage change. While we have demonstrated a causal link between how we 
theorize the past and the possibility of change in the future, we have little understanding of 
how that causal linkage can be manipulated to encourage innovation or to identify 
innovators. So, for example, do successful entrepreneurs differ from the rest of the 
population in how they conceive of the past and its link to future opportunities? Are 
entrepreneurs more apt to revise their view of history to facilitate an envisioned future? 
Similarly, can we encourage innovation by teaching populations to see the past as less 
concrete and therefore less fatalistically path dependant?  
 Another key insight of our analysis is that the construct of organizational identity 
is intimately associated with our assumptions of the degree of objectivity in the past. Those 
who see the past as largely fixed and immutable appear to be more likely to see 
organizational identity as similarly fixed and immutable. By contrast, interpretive 
assumptions about the past make organizational identity a much more fluid and adaptive 
construct. This observation has important implications for revisiting long-standing issues 
in organizational commitment. Do organizations that demonstrate high levels of 
commitment amongst their members rely on narratives of the past that are more objective 
and unchangeable than organizations with low commitment? Are there individual 
differences in assumptions of the past that make some organizational members more apt to 
exhibit high citizenship behaviour than others? 
Traditionally, theories of change have focused on identifying categories of change 
and matching them to different organizational or environmental conditions in order to 
manage the change process. The assumption is that change occurs in the present with a 
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view to overcoming the past. In this paper we reverse that assumption by suggesting that 
many of the impediments to successful change are the product of inherent assumptions 
about the nature of history and the lack of agency that we have in revising the past. 
Our intent in this essay has been to demonstrate a “historical consciousness” in how 
we theorize change in organizations (Suddaby, 2016). By historical consciousness we mean 
a degree of reflexivity or heightened appreciation of how our collective assumptions about 
history can influence our understanding of the present, and how we envision the future 
(Seixas, 2004). Rather than adopting an essentialist view of history as a set of immutable 
facts that must be overcome by constructing an artificial breach or rupture with the past, 
our core insight is that successful change can occur by reframing our attitudes and 
preconceived notions about the past. History actually offers a valuable but underexploited 
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Table 1 
Varieties of History and Theories of Change 
    
 
 History-as-Fact History-as-Power History-as-Sensemaking History-As-Rhetoric 
History is… Objective Objective Subjective Subjective 
Epistemology Positivist Critical Interpretive Constructivist 
Unit of Change Structure Power Relations Meaning Narratives 













Change Occurs… Incrementally Episodically Retrospectively Instrumentally 
Likelihood of Change Low Low/Moderate Moderate High 
Assumption about Agency Low Low/Moderate Moderate High 
Triggers of Change Shocks Conflict Reflexivity Plurality 
